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ESSAY
A MAlTER OF EVIDENCE OR OF LAW?
BAlTERED WOMEN CLAIMING SELFDEFENSE IN CALIFORNIA

Rachel A. Van Cleave*
lNrRODUCI'lON

Domestic violence is a nationwide concern.1 The problem of
domestic violence is of particular concern to women. The statistics overwhelmingly demonstrate that the vast majority of the
victims of domestic violence are women.2 Thirty to fifty percent
of all women murdered are killed by their male partners.3 In an
attempt to alleviate this violence, California has adopted measures which focus on the behavior of the batterer. For example,
California provides procedures by which victims of domestic violence can obtain restraining orders against their batterers, as well
as other measures.4 Such measures are extremely important and

* Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. B.A.
Stanford University, 1986; J.D. Hastings College of the Law, 1989; J.S.M. Stanford
Law School, 1994. The author thanks Professor Miguel Mendez for insightful comments and suggestions, Roberta K. Thyfault for helpful materials and information,
Michael G. Montgomery for excellent research assistance, and Joseph Schottland for
editorial and other support.
1. Violence Against Women Act of 1993, H.R. 1133, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994) (authorizing federal monies to encourage arrests of batterers, for example).
See also Women and Violence: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 110-16 (1990) (testimony of Angela Browne, Ph.D.).
2. See Developments in the Law - Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106
HARV. L. REv. 1498, 1501 nn.1-5 (1993).
3. Cal. S.B. 1144, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. § l(a) (50%); Developments in the Law,
supra note 2, at 1501 n.5 (30%); Nancy Gibbs, 'Til Death Do Us Part, TIME, Jan. 18,
1993, at 38, 41 (30-50%).
4. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6200 et seq. (West 1994). One important aspect of this
law is that it outlines the imposition of restraining orders against batterers. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 262 (West 1994) (defining spousal rape); CAL. PENAL CODE § 602(u)
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California must continue to pursue them. However, where these
measures fail to prevent the repeated battery of victims, a battered woman may resort to violence herself in an effort to save
her own life.
When a woman kills her batterer she must be given a fair
opportunity to present a claim of self-defense to a jury. The most
controversial cases involve battered women who kill their batterers in "non-traditional confrontational" settings,S because courts
have difficulty finding that danger of death or bodily injury to the
woman was imminent.6 Currently, such women face numerous
hurdles to fully presenting their self-defense claims. Traditional
self-defense law permits a defendant to present evidence of prior
threats made by the batterer-victim against the defendant's life
and safety.7 She can also present instances of prior violence or
abuse she suffered at the hands of her batterer.8 But such evidence is usually insufficient to establish the reasonableness of her
use of self-defense in a non-traditional confrontational setting,
due to the requirement that danger be imminent before self-defense is permitted. Furthermore, where the woman has killed in
a non-traditional confrontational setting, some courts have decided that she did not act in self-defense as a matter of law and
thus find such evidence irrelevant.9 For example, when a battered woman kills in reaction to her batterer picking up a beer
(West 1994) (including the refusal to leave a battered women's shelter in the definition of "trespass"); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1000.91 et seq. (West 1994) (allowing referral of those charged with acts involving domestic violence to approved batterer's
programs).
5. This phrase is borrowed from Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality
for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S Ll. 121, 139
(1985) (noting that Battered Woman's Syndrome expert testimony is often excluded
when the woman has killed in a non-traditional, confrontational situation).
6. People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 175 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); see also State v.
Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 577 (Kan. 1988); State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8,13-16 (N.C.
1989). But see State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Minn. 1989).
7. See People v. Bush, 148 Cal. Rptr. 430, 436 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (holding
that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury to consider prior threats as relevant to the reasonableness of defendant's exercise of self-defense); see also People v.
Moore, 275 P.2d 485, 490 (Cal. 1954).
8. See People v. Yokum, 302 P.2d 406, 497 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (holding
that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the decedent's prior threats and
violent conduct toward the defendant who claimed she killed in self-defense).
9. See Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 179 (finding that the defendant was not entitled
to a "perfect" self-defense jury instruction, but that the expert testimony could support an instruction for "imperfect" self-defense). For a discussion of the difference
between perfect and imperfect self-defense, see infra note 28 and accompanying
text.
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bottle, she does not kill in a traditional confrontational setting.10
Similarly, where she kills her sleeping batterer in reaction to earlier death threats by the batterer, the setting is not traditionally
confrontational. l l
The findings stated in a bill pending before the California
Legislature indicate that at least some members of the Legislature acknowledge that self-defense law as it is currently interpreted by the courts is inadequate to deal with the situations in
which a battered woman kills her batterer. The bill reports that
"[o]ne half of all women murdered in the United States are murdered by domestic partners or former domestic partners. "12 The
bill explains that "[i]n many situations women who are subject to
repeated patterns of violence by their domestic partners are unable to flee from the relationship because of intimidation, threats
of physical violence, ... which cause these women to be, in effect,
victims of false imprisonment."13 Finally, it states that "[s]tudies
have shown that the intimidation and threats of violence that
make these women victims of felony false imprisonment are real
and that women are most likely to be murdered when attempting
to report abuse or to leave an abusive relationship. "14 The bill
concludes that the
current law of justifiable homicide . . . does not allow these
women to claim self-defense because the practical effect of the
'reasonable person' standard imposed upon jurors results in
their finding that these women are not entitled to justifiable
homicide defenses because they did not attempt to escape
what they actually perceived as imminent danger. 1s

The bill proposes to alter existing self-defense doctrine by, essentially, creating a separate defense for victims of abuse.
Some commentators argue that the situation of a battered
woman who kills her batterer does not fit into traditional selfdefense law because the law of self-defense was developed by
10. State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475, 479 (Kan. 1985) (holding that the use of the
word "immediate" rather than "imminent" in jury instructions had the effect of precluding the jury from considering prior abuse inflicted by the decedent with beer
bottles, requiring a reversal of the defendant's conviction).
11. Aris,264 Cal. Rptr. at 171. After a vicious beating, he told her that he did
not think she would live until the morning and she killed him while he slept. Her
conviction of second degree murder was upheld. Id.
12. See Cal. S.B. 1144, supra note 3, § l(a).
13. Id. § l(b).
14. Id. § l(c).
15. Id. § l(e).
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men and with masculine confontational settings in mind. 16 The
focus of such discussions tends to be on the requirement that a
defendant's use of self-defense be reasonable. These commentators suggest relaxing this objective standard, arguing that it is not
truly objectiveP Some propose a "reasonable battered woman"
standard. 1s Criticism of this approach includes claims that it will
result in a stereotyping of women and will require all women
who claim they killed in self-defense to prove that they were also
battered women. 19 Other commentators argue that the problem
is not with the elements and definitions of self-defense, but
rather with how those rules are applied by courts.20 I agree that
there should not be a separate self-defense law for either women
or battered women. Nor should there be exceptions to traditional self-defense doctrine when a woman or a battered woman
is a defendant. However, courts should not unduly restrict evidentiary rules and elements of self-defense when a battered woman kills her batterer while he sleeps, as occurred in People v.
Aris.21
This essay examines the obstacles battered women face in
the form of evidentiary rules and in the definitions of certain elements of self-defense, focusing specifically on the appellate court
opinion in Aris. The essay then evaluates existing and pending
legislation in California which has sought to undo the narrowing
effected by Aris. Finally, the essay proposes statutory language
which would be more effective in ensuring that battered women
who kill their batterers in non-traditional confrontational situations may fully present their claims of self-defense. Where a defendant claims self-defense and presents evidence regarding the
Battered Woman Syndrome ("BWS"), my proposal would re16. See CYNTIiIA GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE 31-49 (1989) (stating that
the law of self-defense was originally intended to handle barroom brawls and attacks
by strangers during the perpetration of a crime); see also Alison M. Madden, Clemency for Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers: Finding a Just Forum, 4 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S LJ. 1, 22-25 (1993).
17. See Cal. S.B. 1144, supra note 3, § l(a).
18. See, e.g., Kit Kinports, Defending Battered Women's Self-Defense Claims, 67
OR. L. REv. 393, 415-22 (1988).
19. See Crocker, supra note 5, at 144-46 (citing State v. Kelly, 655 P.2d 1202,
1203 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 685 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1984)
(seeming to conclude that in order to aquit the defendant the jury had to find that
she was a battered woman and that she acted in self-defense».
20. See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 379, 432-37 (1991).
21. 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
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quire judges to instruct juries to consider such testimony when
evaluating the reasonableness of the defendant's use of self-defense. Furthermore, where the defendant alternatively argues
for "imperfect" self-defense, the proposal clarifies the definition
of "imminence" to be whether the defendant actually believed
the danger to her life was imminent.
I.

SELF-DEFENSE AND BA'ITERED WOMAN SYNDROME

In California, murder is defined as "the unlawful killing of a
human being ... with malice aforethought."22 One way to prove
that the defendant acted with malice is to show that "no considerable provocation" was present.23 The Penal Code provides
that murder is excused when "committed ... in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation."24 Thus, the
presence of sufficient provocation mitigates murder to manslaughter, while its absence is one way to prove the element of
malice aforethought under California law.25 Murder is justified
"[w]hen committed in the lawful defense of [the defendant] ... ,
when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design to commit a felony or to do some great bodily injury, and imminent
danger of such design being accomplished."26 This defense has
been interpreted as requiring the defendant to show that she
honestly (or actually) believed she had to defend herself and that
a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have believed that self-defense was necessary.27 Where a defendant kills
in the honest and reasonable belief that she needs to defend herself, she acts with justification and must be found not gUilty. The
California Supreme Court has held that where a defendant
charged with murder is able to prove that she honestly believed
self-defense was necessary, but fails to satisfy the reasonableness
requirement, she establishes "imperfect self-defense" and is
guilty only of manslaughter.28
22. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988).
23. Id. § 188.
24. Id. § 195(2).
25. See PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT
159-62 (4th ed. 1990).
26. CAL. PENAL CODE § 197(3) (West 1988).
27. People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); see also People
v. Williams, 142 Cal. Rptr. 704, 709 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
28. In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574 (Cal. 1994) (holding that the California Legislature did not eliminate "imperfect self-defense" in amendments to the penal
code); People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1979) (holding that the existence of an
honest but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense is inconsistent with the
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A battered woman charged with the murder of her batterer
may attempt to bolster her claim that she killed in self-defense by
introducing evidence of the BWS. BWS is not, in and of itself, a
defense to murder,29 nor is it a disease.3o Rather, it describes a
set of circumstances in which any woman might find herself.
BWS evidence can help a jury to evaluate a battered woman's
claim of self-defense. An expert on BWS can describe to the jury
the three phase cycle of violence characteristic of BWS.31 The
first, "tension-building" phase, consists of minor batterings by
the woman's intimate partner, such as slaps, as well as psychological abuse such ~s name-calling and other verbal abuse.32 This
phase is followed by an "acute battering incident" consisting of
an uncontrollable release of tension and is distinguished by its
"savagery, destructiveness, and uncontrolled nature."33 It is during this second phase that the woman suffers the most severe
physical injuries. The batterer inflicts serious physical injury in
any number of ways. He pushes her down stairs breaking her
ribs,34 he uses his fists to beat her,35 or he employs other weapons, such as hammers,36 or steel-toed boots.37 He might also
abuse her sexually, forcing her to submit to sado-masochistic sexual acts.38 The third phase, the "loving contrition phase," follows
the acute battering incident.39 During this phase the batterer
might promise to stop beating the woman,40 beg her forgiveness,
malice element of Penal Code § 187). The honest but unreasonable belief doctrine
has also been called either "imperfect" or "partial" self-defense.
29. GILLESPIE, supra note 16, at 159. However, sometimes courts refer to the
syndrome as the "battered wife defense." See State v. Anaya, 456 A.2d 1255, 1266
(Me. 1983).
30. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATI'ERED WOMAN SYNDROME 20-21 (1979);
see also Michael Dowd, Dispelling the Myths About the "Battered Woman's Defense": Towards a New Understanding, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 567, 578 (1992) (arguing that BWS should be viewed as "the responses and characteristics of a normal
woman who finds herself in a defective or dysfunctional relationship"); Kinports,
supra note 18, at 417 n.90.
31. LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LoVE: WHY BATI'ERED WOMEN KILL
AND How SOCIETY RESPONDS 42 (1989).
32. [d.
33. [d. at 43.
34. See State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475, 475 (Kan. 1985).
35. See Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 629 (D.C. 1979).
36. See Commonwealth v. Craig, 783 S.W.2d 387, 388 (Ky. 1990), overruled by
Dyer v. Commonwealth, 816 S.W.2d 647 (Ky. 1991).
37. See State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 795 (Minn. 1989).
38. See Fielder v. State, 756 S.W.2d 309, 311 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other
grounds, 834 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1992); see also WALKER, supra note 30, at 47-51.
39. WALKER, supra note 31, at 44.
40. See State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475, 477 (Kan. 1985).
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and even admit that he has a problem.41 However, in" many battering relationships, this phase becomes shorter and shorter in
duration, amounting to simply a cessation of violence. 42 It is this
third phase that gives the battered woman hope that he will
change which "provides positive reinforcement for [her] remaining in the relationship."43
The expert can also explain why, in many situations, a batt~red woman does not leave the violent relationship, or even
seek help.44 The notion of staying in a relationship fraught with
violence is incomprehensible to most jurors who have not lived in
such a relationship.45 An expert might explain to the jury reasons why a battered woman might stay in such a relationship, and
that such women do not remain in the relationship because they
enjoy the beatings.46 An expert can explain that any woman
could find herself in a battering relationship: "[t]here is no
predisposing prototype for these [battered] women."47 It is clear
that in California BWS expert testimony is admissible to convey
this general information to the jury.48
California's and most states' laws allow the expert to state
her conclusion that the particular defendant in fact suffered from
BWS at the time she killed her batterer.49 This is important, be41. See Fielder, 756 S.W.2d at 311.
42. WALKER, supra note 30, at 96.
43. ld. Describing what happened after incidents of battering by her husband,
Rita Collins stated, "[a]fterward he'd soothe me, and I'd think, he's a good man.
What did I do wrong?" Gibbs, supra note 3, at 38.
44. CHARLES P. EWING, BATIERED WOMEN WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL
SELF-DEFENSE AS LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 20 (1987).
45. GILLESPIE, supra note 16, at 157-60.
46. See Kinports, supra note 18, at 400-01. For example, women might remain
in such relationships for economic reasons, or due to feelings of helplessness.
47. See WALKER, supra note 31, at 101-02 ("Battered women come from all
types of economic, cultural, religious, and racial backgrounds.... They are women
like you. Like me."); Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1501 ("No segment
of society is immune from this violence - battering is prevalent among every economic, racial and ethnic group.").
48. See People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); MIGUEL MEN.
DEZ, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 15.09, at 293 (1993); James O. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Admissibility of Expert or Opinion Testimony on Battered Wife or Battered
Woman Syndrome, 18 A.L.R. 4TH 1153 (1982).
49. Pearson, supra note 48, at 1153. However, the admission of such a conclusion by the expert does not establish self-defense, nor should the preclusion of this
testimony bar a claim of self-defense. Women who kill should not have to prove
both that they suffered from BWS and that they were justified in killing their batterers. See Crocker, supra note 5, at 145-46. Nonetheless, the conclusion that the
defendant is in fact a battered woman may still be necessary to avoid a situation in
which jurors may conclude that since the expert did not say she suffered from BWS,
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cause the general BWS testimony may be confusing to jurors unless the expert links this to the particular defendant.
Furthermore, jurors will likely feel ill-equipped to determine
whether the defendant suffered from BWS. For example, in her
appeal, Ms. Aris argued that "Dr. Walker's inability to testify
that appellant was a battered woman led at least one [juror]-the
foreperson-to conclude that Ms. Aris did not [suffer from] the
syndrome because they were not told she had the syndrome."5o
However, beyond the uses of BWS testimony described above, it
is not clear the extent to which an expert can testify as to the
specific circumstances in which a particular defendant found herself. For example, it is not clear whether a BWS expert can state
her opinion that the defendant honestly feared for her life when
she killed her batterer, or that a reasonable woman in the defendant's situation would have feared for her life and would have
killed in self-defense. Most courts are wary of allowing such testimony, fearing that the jury will adopt the expert's conclusion
without analyzing the facts on its own.51 In addition to these evidentiary issues surrounding BWS, California law has become
muddled as to the definitions of "imminence" and "reasonableness" within the context of self-defense law. The following section explores these ambiguities, focusing on People v. Aris.52
II.

PEOPLE

v.

ARIS

In Aris, a jury convicted the defendant of second degree
murder for killing her sleeping husband.53 At trial, Ms. Aris testified to the violence and abuse to which her husband subjected
her over the course of their ten-year marriage.54 She also testified that her husband had severely beaten her that evening and
she must not have, and therefore, is not entitled to claim that she killed in selfdefense.
50. Brief for Appellant at 104, People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178 (1989) (No.
EOO5418).
51. E.g., Anne L. Braswell, Note, Resurrection of the Ultimate Issue Rule: Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) and the Insanity Defense, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 620,
621-22 (1987); Rick Brown, Note, Limitations on Expert Testimony on the Battered
Woman Syndrome in Homicide Cases: The Return of the Ultimate Issue Rule, 32
ARIZ. L. REv. 665 (1990).
52. 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
53. The trial court sentenced Ms. Aris to 15 years to life in prison. In June,
1993, California Governor Pete Wilson reduced her sentence by making her eligible
for parole one and a haIf years earlier than she would have been otherwise. Wilson's
Cautious Clemency, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 4,1993, at B6.
54. Arts, 264 Cal Rptr. at 171.
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had threatened that he did not think he would let her live until
the morning.55 The trial court permitted Ms. Aris to present general expert testimony regarding BWS, that is, to describe the
three cycles of violence and to explain why it is difficult for a
battered woman to leave the relationship. However, the trial
court did not allow the expert, Dr. Lenore E. Walker, to state her
opinion that Ms. Aris suffered from BWS when she shot her husband, nor to testify as to how Ms. Aris' "experiences as a battered woman affected her perceptions of danger, its imminence,
and what actions were necessary to protect herself."56 Nor did
the trial court instruct the jury on perfect self-defense; instead, it
instructed the jury on imperfect self-defense and second degree
murder.
The court of appeal found that the trial court erred in these
respects.57 The court found that the expert's opinion that the defendant suffered from BWS was not barred by People v. Bledsoe.58 In Bledsoe, an expert was not allowed to state that the
rape victim suffered from "Rape Trauma Syndrome" (RTS) in
the prosecution of the alleged rapist.59 The California Supreme
Court determined in Bledsoe that it would be too prejudicial to
allow the expert to conclude that since the victim exhibited the
symptoms of RTS, the victim was in fact raped. Further, the
court reasoned that there was no support that RTS could reliably
prove whether a rape had been committed. In contrast, the defendant in Aris sought the admission of the expert's opinion that
she had been battered not to prove that her husband had committed a crime, but rather to support her claim of self-defense.6o
The appellate court further found that Dr. Walker's proposed
testimony regarding how Ms. Aris' experiences as a battered woman affected her perceptions of danger and imminence were rel55. Brief for Appellant at 113, People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178 (1989) (No.
EOO5418).
56. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
57. While the reviewing court found that the trial court committed error, the
court upheld Ms. Aris' conviction on the grounds that these errors were harmless.
Id. at 180-82.
58. 681 P.2d 291 (Cal. 1984) (holding that an expert could not opine, based
upon the victim's behavior according to Rape Trauma Syndrome ("RTS"), that the
victim had actually been raped, but finding the erroneous admission was harmless in
this case).
59. See also In re Sara M., 239 Cal. Rptr. 605 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that
the expert could not testify, based upon Child Sexual Abuse Accomodation Syndrome, that the child had actually been abused).
60. Aris,264 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
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evant to the issue of whether Ms. Aris genuinely believed that it
was necessary to defend herself, but emphasized that such testimony could not be used to support the reasonableness of her use
of self-defense. 61 In other words, where a battered woman
claims self-defense and presents expert BWS testimony, "trial
courts should instruct [the jury] that such testimony is relevant
only to prove the honest belief requirement for both perfect and
imperfect self-defense, not to prove the reasonableness requirement for perfect self-defense."62
Additionally, the appellate court determined that the trial
court properly prohibited Dr. Walker from stating her opinion
that Ms. Aris "actually perceived that she was in imminent danger and needed to kill in self-defense."63 The appellate court
held that the expert's opinion regarding Ms. Aris' genuine and
honest belief in the need for self-defense violated Penal Code
section 29 which states that an expert "shall not testify as to
whether the defendant had or did not have the required mental
states, which include, . . . malice aforethought, for the crimes
charged."64 The court then concluded that "having an actual perception that one is in imminent danger negates malice aforethought, ... [therefore] Dr. Walker was properly prohibited from
stating an opinion that the defendant actually perceived that she
was in imminent danger and needed to kill in self-defense."65
The court reached this conclusion based on two cases. First,
in People v. Flannel,66 the California Supreme Court held that an
honest, but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense negates the malice aforethought element of murder as a matter of
law, thus affirming the so-called "imperfect" or "partial" self-defense doctrine. Without this analysis, a defendant who acted in
self-defense under an honest but unreasonable belief of immi61. [d. ("[S]uch [expert testimony] is relevant only to prove the honest belief
requirement . . . not to prove the reasonableness requirement for perfect selfdefense.").
62. [d. (emphasis added).
63. [d.
64. CAL. PENAL CoDE § 29 (West 1988) (emphasis added).
65. People v. Aris,264 Cal. Rptr. 167,180 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (citations omitted). Contra, MENDEZ, supra note 48, at 393 n.24.
66. 603 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979). In Flannel, two men had a history of violent relations, and the defendant shot the victim after threatening him, but believing that he
was reaching for a pocket knife. After shooting the victim, the defendant stated that
the victim deserved to die and no one would care. [d. at 3. The Supreme Court held
that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the "unreasonable belief" doctrine. [d. at 8.
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nent danger would be convicted of murder. Instead, under imperfect self-defense analysis such a situation would result in a
negation of malice aforethought, reducing the conviction to
manslaughter.67
The doctrine of imperfect self-defense is somewhat analogous to the "heat of passion" doctrine. Where a defendant kills
in the heat of passion, the malice element required for murder is
negated and the conviction is reduced to manslaughter. 68 However, the analogy is not complete. California follows the common law definition of malice for murder as the absence of
provocation.69 Thus, the absence of provocation may prove the
existence of malice as a matter of law and of evidence.7o Selfdefense, on the other hand, is a justification, and its elements are
separate from those of the crime charged. It is "in the nature of
confession and avoidance;"71 the defendant admits she had the
intent to kill, but she was justified in doing so because she had to
protect herself from an imminent threat.72 The absence of a genuine belief in the need to kill does not prove the existence of
malice under California's definition of murder. An honest but
unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense negates malice
aforethought as a matter of law only by reducing the charge to
manslaughter. Such an honest belief is simply inconsistent with
the element of malice aforethought for murder, again, as a matter of law.73 The appellate court in Aris incorrectly relied on
Flannel to support its conclusion that Penal Code section 29, a
rule of evidence, barred Dr. Walker from stating her conclusion
that Ms. Aris honestly feared for her life when she killed her
husband. That conclusion is not related to a mental state required for the crime charged, as a matter of evidence; rather, it
relates to the presence of an honest belief in the need for selfdefense. Therefore, it is not an element of the crime of murder,
but instead supports an affirmative defense to murder.
67. This has been called "imperfect self-defense."
68. See CAL. PENAL CoDE § 192 (West 1994) ("[M]anslaughter is the unlawful
killing ... without malice ... upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion."); id. § 195
(Homicide is excused "when committed ... in the heat of passion.").
69. Id. § 188.
70. See JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 159-62.
71. MENDEZ, supra note 48, § 15.09, at 393 n.24.
72. Id. § 15.09, at 293.
73. Despite recent arguments that either the legislature or the voters eliminated
the doctrine of imperfect self-defense when they abolished diminished capacity, the
California Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the doctrine in In re Christian S., 872
P.2d 574 (Cal. 1994).
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The second relevant case relied on by the appellate court in
Aris, People v. Czahara,74 involved a defendant who claimed that
he attempted murder in the "heat of passion upon provocation,"
and requested that the trial court allow his expert to so testify.75
Relying on section 29 of the Penal Code, the trial court in
Czahara held that the expert's opinion was not admissible because section 29 prohibits an expert from opining as to whether
the defendant had or did not have the mental state required for
the crime charged.76 Affirming, the appellate court stated that
"[h]eat of passion upon sufficient provocation is not merely evidence that malice was absent, it is by legal definition the absence
of malice. To prove heat of passion and provocation is to prove
that the defendant did not kill, or attempt to kill, with malice
aforethought."77 Again, by statute the state can prove the malice
element of murder by showing the absence of provocation or
heat of passion. Therefore, where the expert states an opinion
that the defendant acted in the heat of passion, the expert necessarily states that the defendant "did not have the required mental
state ... for [murder]."78 The expert opinion was offered to disprove the element of malice required for murder, as a matter of
evidence, thus the evidentiary rule set out in Penal Code section
29 barred the testimony offered in Czahara.79
Comparing Penal Code section 29 to a similar provision
under the Federal Rules of Evidence is instructive in illustrating
the erroneous analysis of the Aris court. Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) bars expert testimony as to the mental state of a
criminal defendant in the form of "an opinion or inference as to
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or
condition constituting an element of the crime charged or a defense thereto."80 The federal rule would more clearly bar the admission of an expert's opinion as to a defendant's honest belief in
the need for self-defense, since this would be a mental state re74. 250 Cal. Rptr. 836 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
75. [d. at 841.
76. [d. at 842. The court pennitted the expert to testify as to the "profound
agitation" and "emotional tunnoil" which "short circuited" the defendant's reason
and judgment. Therefore, the court determined that even if Penal Code § 29 barred
the expert from using the words "heat of passion," such testimony would not have
resulted in a different verdict. Thus, the court affirmed Czahara's conviction for the
attempted murder of his fonner girlfriend. [d.
77. [d. at 841.
78. CAL. PENAL CODE § 29 (West 1988).
79. People v. Czahara, 250 Cal. Rptr. 836, 836 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
80. FED. R. EVID. 704(b) (emphasis added).
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quired for a defense to the crime of murder. However, the California version of this rule, Penal Code section 29, does not bar an
expert's opinion testimony as to the defendant's mental state
which relates to a claim of self-defense. Applying the above reasoning to Aris, under self-defense law, where the defendant offers expert testimony that the defendant genuinely believed selfdefense was necessary, she is not attempting to disprove malice,
as a matter of evidence. Rather, she seeks to support her affirmative claim of perfect or imperfect self-defense as a matter of law
only.
The court in Aris relied on the Flannel court's affirmance of
imperfect self-defense doctrine to support its determination that
a defendant's actual belief in the need for self-defense proves the
absence of malice. The court then also relied on the Czahara
court's application of Penal Code section 29 to preclude testimony that the defendant was not acting in the heat of passion
since it proves the absence of malice. The Aris court incorrectly
combined the analysis of these two cases and determined that
since an honest but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense negates malice aforethought, the expert's opinion that the
defendant had an honest belief violates section 29 of the Penal
Code. Essentially, the court treated the existence of a genuine
belief in the need for self-defense as disproof of malice aforethought as a matter of law and of evidence, thus subjecting it to
the requirements of Penal Code section 29. The court's reasoning on this point is brief: "Since having an actual [honest] perception that one is in imminent danger negates malice
aforethought we hold that Dr. Walker was properly prohibited
from stating an opinion that defendant actually perceived that
she was in imminent danger and needed to kill in self-defense."81
This analysis is incorrect. The existence of a genuine belief in the
need for self-defense, while negating malice as a matter of law
under the court's holding in Flannel, does not disprove malice as
a matter of evidence. Evidence that the defendant killed in the
heat of passion proves that the defendant did not kill with malice
aforethought. However, evidence that the defendant killed in
the actual belief in the need to defend herself does not prove the
lack of malice aforethought. Rather, the defendant's actual belief in the need for self-defense is an element of self-defense, not
81. People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 180 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (citations
omitted).
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an element of the crime of murder. Section 29 of the Penal Code
applies in Czahara because the defendant sought to include the
expert's opinion that the defendant attempted murder while acting in the heat of passion to prove the lack of malice aforethought. Section 29 does not apply in Aris, since the expert's
testimony that the defendant actually believed she had to kill
would have supported her claim that she acted in self-defense,
not to prove the absence of malice aforethought. Certainly, the
effect of such evidence might negate malice as a matter of law
under Flannel, but it would not disprove, as a matter of evidence,
the lack of malice aforethought. Imperfect or partial self-defense
is separate from the elements of murder, by definition because
elements of self-defense do not disprove the element of malice
aforethought required for murder.
While the court in Flannel held that an honest but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense negates malice aforethought, the court emphasized that the doctrine of unreasonable
belief is not "bound with or limited by concepts of . . . heat of
passion."82 The California Supreme Court recently reiterated
the separation of the doctrines of imperfect self-defense and diminished capacity in In re Christian S.83 The court held that statutory amendments which sought to eliminate the defense of
diminished capacity did not affect the doctrine of imperfect selfdefense.84 The court stated that while these doctrines can mitigate murder to manslaughter, imperfect self-defense is "independent of [heat of passion] and independent of diminished
capacity."85 The court in Aris incorrectly linked heat of passion
with imperfect self-defense in its application of Penal Code section 29. The expert's opinion that the defendant honestly believed her life was in danger does not disprove the malice
aforethought element of murder, but rather supports the defendant's affirmative claim of self-defense. Therefore, section 29 is
not intended to bar an expert's opinion that a battered woman
honestly believed that she was in imminent danger.
The appellate court also concluded that the trial court correctly excluded Dr. Walker's statement that in her "professional
82. People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1979); see also In re Christian S., 872
P.2d 574, 579-80 (Cal. 1994) (rejecting the argument that imperfect self-defense was
developed from diminished capacity and was therefore abolished by Proposition 8).
83. 872 P.2d 574 (Cal. 1994).
84. Id. at 578-80.
85. Id. at 578.
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opinion ... [Ms. Aris] had a reasonable perception of danger."86
To support this conclusion, the Aris court delved into a discussion distinguishing justification from excuse.87 The court stated
that justification focuses on the defendant's act, while excuse focuses on the actor.88 Since self-defense is a justification, the
court determined that it was only concerned with the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct, not with the reasonableness of
her mental processes. Therefore, according to the court, the expert's opinion that the defendant's belief in the need for self-defense was reasonable is irrelevant.89 While there is a theoretical
difference between excuse and justification, the distinction is not
helpful where reasonableness is not a purely objective standard,
but includes a consideration of the defendant's situation and the
circumstances in which the defendant employed self-defense.
In California, when a defendant claims that he acted in selfdefense, juries are instructed that the killing was justifed if the
defendant "honestly and reasonably believe[d] ... [t]hat it was
necessary under the circumstances to kill the other person to prevent death or great bodily injury to herself."90 By instructing the
jury on the amount of force a defendant might use to defend herself, a court tells a jury that a defendant "may use all force and
means which she believes to be reasonably necessary and which
would appear to a reasonable person, in the same or similar circumstances, to be necessary to prevent the injury which appears
to be imminent."91 Circumstances which a jury may consider include prior acts of violence by the decedent against the defendant.92 For example, in People v. Torres,93 the defendant claimed
86. People v. Aris,264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 179 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). While the expert might be permitted to state conclusions as to hypotheticals posed by the attorney, unless the expert does not state a final conclusion linking those hypotheticals to
the defendant being tried, jurors might be more confused. See Braswell, supra note
51, at 635. This is similar to the situation where the expert is not permitted to state
whether, in her professional opinion, she thinks that the defendant in fact suffered
from BWS; jurors are likely to conclude that if the expert did not say so, she must
not have. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
87. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 178-79.
88. [d.
89. [d.
90. CAUIC, CRIM. 5.12 (emphasis added).
91. CAUIC, CRIM. 5.30 (emphasis added).
92. People v. Torres, 210 P.2d 324, 326-28 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949) (finding
that it was reversible error for the court to fail to instruct the jury that they could
consider the prior threats of violence by the decedent in evaluating the reasonableness of the defendant's exercise of self-defense).
93. [d.
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that he thought the victim was reaching for a knife in his
pocket. 94 Although the defendant was mistaken, the court determined that a reasonable jury could find the defendant's mistake
reasonable upon considering the prior threats by the decedent to
the defendant. 95 Therefore, the reasonableness prong of self-defense includes not only the reasonableness of the act but also the
reasonableness of the defendant's belief, or mental process, in
evaluating the need for self-defense.
Early in the Aris opinion itself, the court sets out the law of
self-defense and states that one requirement of self-defense is
that "a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have
had the same perception and done the same acts."96 This supports the proposition that reasonable self-defense law is not concerned only with the reasonableness of the defendant's actions
but also with the reasonableness of her perception and belief in
the need for self-defense. Therefore, expert testimony which
links the circumstances of the battered woman defendant to the
reasonableness of both her belief in the need to defend herself
and her act of self-defense is relevant to her claim of self-defense.
In sum, as to the evidentiary issues, the Aris court held that
Penal Code section 29 bars a BWS expert from stating her opinion that the defendant honestly believed her life was in danger.
The court also held that the reasonableness of the defendant's
belief is irrelevant, stating that the justification of self-defense is
concerned only with the reasonableness of the defendant's act.97
As a result of these holdings Ms. Aris was unable to present a
claim of perfect self-defense, nor was she able to bolster her
claim of imperfect self-defense. These holdings demonstrate how
a court's narrowing of self-defense doctrine combined with its incorrect application of evidentiary rules can make it impossible
for ~ battered woman to get her claim of self-defense to a jury.
In addition to the evidentiary holdings in Aris, the appellate
court further precluded Ms. Aris' claim of self-defense by upholding unduly narrow applications of reasonableness and imminence. The appellate court upheld the trial court's refusal to
instruct the jury on perfect self-defense on the ground that the
defendant's use of self-defense was unreasonable as a matter of
94. Id. at 325-26.
95. Id. at 327.
96. People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis
added).
97. Id. at 179.
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law. The court reached this conclusion based on the evidence
that Ms. Aris' husband-batterer was sleeping at the moment
when she fired the gun at him, and no " 'jury composed of reasonable men could have concluded that' a sleeping victim
presents an imminent danger of great bodily harm."98 The
court's conclusion that Ms. Aris' use of self-defense was unreasonable as a matter of law precluded the jury from considering
whether Ms. Aris' use of self-defense was, in fact, reasonable.
Moreover, this holding illustrates the difficulty battered women have in presenting their claims of self-defense when they kill
in a non-traditional confrontational setting.99 The issue of
"whether the circumstances would cause a reasonable person to
perceive the necessity of [self-defense] . . . , [is] normally [a]
question of fact for the trier of fact to resolve."loo While evidence of abuse alone is insufficient to warrant an instruction on
self-defense, in Aris the defendant testified that her husband had
beaten her that evening and had threatened that he did not think
he would let her live until morning. lOl She also presented expert
testimony which explained how a woman who lives in a battering
relationship may fear for her life in situations where others
would not hold such a fear, to support the reasonableness of her
use of self-defense against her sleeping batterer. 102 The defendant thus presented sufficient evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable persons could have concluded that she acted
in self-defense.103 A court should not take such a factual issue
away from the jury except where a defendant has failed to present any evidence to support an instruction. Furthermore, where
a defendant has presented evidence to support a defense, the
trial court should not "undertake to weigh the credibility"l04 of
such evidence, since this is "a task exclusively relegated to the
jury."105
98. [d. at 176 (quoting People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1979».
99. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
100. People v. Clark, 181 Cal. Rptr. 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
101. Brief for Appellant at 113, People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178 (1989) (No.
E005418).
102. [d.
103. See People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1979) (requiring trial courts to
give requested instructions where a defendant presents substantial evidence to support the instruction).
104. [d. at 8.
105. [d.; see also Maguigan, supra note 20, at 439-42 (arguing that this procedural issue is critical to the defendant's ability to get her claim of self-defense to a
jury).
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While the trial court did instruct the jury on imperfect selfdefense, the court's definition of "imminence" effectively precluded the jury from finding that the defendant believed she was
confronted with an imminent threat. lOO The appellate court upheld the trial judge's explanation that "[i]mminent peril, . . .
means that the peril must have existed at the very time the fatal
shot was fired."lo7 The effects of this instruction were several.
First, the instruction focused the jury's attention on the moment
at which Ms. Aris fired the gun. However, California law permits
juries to consider evidence of prior threats by the deceased to the
defendant in determining the honesty of the defendant's belief in
the need to use self-defense. lo8 Second, the court's definition of
"imminence" included the statement that "the peril must appear
to the defendant as immediate and present and not prospective
or even in the near future."l09 Use of the word "immediate,"
which connotes a much shorter time frame than "imminent,"lIO
similarly precluded the jury from considering the years of violence and abuse which the decedent inflicted upon Ms. Aris. Finally, by not emphasizing the factual nature of the question of
imminence,11l the court gave the impression that an absolute, or
objective definition of "imminence" exists.1I2
106. See Madden, supra note 16, at 30. The instruction equated "imminent" with
"immediate": "[t]he peril must appear to the defendant as immediate and present
and not prospective or even in the near future." People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167,
173 (Cal. ct. App. 1989). One juror later commented that "once [the judge] gave us
his definition it was no longer a jury case; he decided the case." Madden, supra note
16, at 30 n.121 (quoting Candy J. Cooper, Juror Tells of Pressure to Say Guilty, S.F.
EXAMINER, Aug. 31, 1992, at A9).
107. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 172. (emphasis added).
108. People v. Pena, 198 Cal. Rptr. 819, 826 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). In Aris, the
jury initially had been instructed to consider Mr. Aris' prior threats to and abuse of
Ms. Aris to determine whether she honestly believed she had to defend herself.
However, this came before the jury began deliberations. On at least three occasions,
the jury interrupted their deliberations to request more instruction on the definition
of "imminence"; however, they were not reinstructed specifically on the effect of
prior violence by the decedent. Brief for Appellant at 136-137, People v. Aris, 215
Cal. App. 3d 1178 (1989) (No. EOO5418).
109. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 173. (emphasis added).
110. See State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475, 477-81 (Kan. 1985) (holding that the use
of "immediate" rather than "imminent" to describe the feared danger improperly
limited the jury's consideration of prior abuse of the defendant by the decedent).
111. See People v. Torres, 210 P.2d 324 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949).
112. This is illustrated by the fact that the jury asked the court whether "there [is]
a length of time for [imminence]? Hours, days?" The court responded with "[t]hat's
something you'll have to decide." Brief of Appellant at 127, People v. Aris, 215 Cal.
App. 3d 1178 (1989) (No. EOO5418).
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Essentially, the court's definition of "imminence" required
the jury to find that Ms. Aris acted out of fear of a danger or
threat which would have appeared imminent to a reasonable person. However, if the jury had so concluded, they would have determined that Ms. Aris had acted in complete self-defense.113
The appellate court's affirmance indicates that the definition of
"imminence" is the same whether the defendant claims perfect
self-defense, or claims that she acted upon an honest but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense.114 However, in Flannel, the court stated that "[i]t is the honest belief of imminent
peril that negates malice."115 An honest perception that an imminent danger exists, even if not imminent to a reasonable person, is what distinguishes imperfect from perfect self-defense.
Thus, the court in Aris erroneously defined "imminence" in the
context of imperfect self-defense. If the jury in Aris believed
that Ms. Aris honestly feared for her life, they should have convicted her of manslaughter rather than second degree murder;
Ms. Aris should not have been required to convince the jury that
the danger was also imminent to a reasonable person.116 The
trial court's definition of "imminence" and its determination of
unreasonable self-defense as a matter of law, in addition to the
court's evidentiary holdings, hindered Ms. Aris' ability to fully
present her claims of perfect and imperfect self-defense and led
to an unfair conviction of second-degree murder.

III. LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS
As mentioned earlier, the California Legislature has attempted to remedy the problems faced by women like Ms. Aris
from two angles. Initially, California lawmakers opted for an evi113. However, as discussed earlier, the jury was not instructed on perfect selfdefense.
114. People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 172-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
115. People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1979) (emphasis added). The court in
Flannel also quoted People v. Lewis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 263, 270 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960),
which found that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct on manslaughter, stating "[a] jury might wen find that defendant was acting in [genuine] fear, but that
under the circumstances [where the deceased was unconscious when the defendant
ran to get a hatchet], ... he was not acting in a reasonably founded belief of imminent peril to life or great bodily harm."
116. While the California Supreme Court has recently cited to the Aris definition
of "imminence" in a claim of "imperfect self-defense," In re Christian S., 872 P.2d
574,583 (Cal. 1994), the court failed to clarify that the focus must be on whether the
defendant feared an imminent danger to her life, not whether a reasonable person
would have perceived an imminent danger.
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dentiary approach and, in 1991, added section 1107 to the Evidence Code, providing for the admission of expert testimony
regarding BWS in criminal cases.117 The provision provides, in
part, that:
expert testimony is admissible by either the prosecution or the
defense regarding battered women's [sic] syndrome, including
the physical, emotional, or mental effects upon the beliefs,
perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence, except when offered against a criminal defendant to prove the
occurrence of the act ... of abuse which form the basis of the
criminal charge.llS

Section 1107 clearly addresses any potential objections that BWS
testimony is unreliable scientific evidence, stating that "[e]xpert
opinion testimony on battered women's [sic] syndrome shall not
be considered a new scientific technique whose reliability is unproven."119 Thus, where the defendant can establish that the testimony is relevant, and that the expert is otherwise qualified,
section 1107 permits an expert to testify that the woman suffered
from BWS when she killed her batterer.12o
However, it is not clear whether section 1107 allows an expert to state an opinion as to the honesty of the defendant's belief that it was necessary to kill her batterer to avoid death or
great bodily injury. Certainly, such testimony is relevant to this
element of self-defense, but section 1107 does not expressly indicate whether such testimony is barred by section 29 of the Penal
Code as the Aris court determined. Nor does section 1107 indicate whether an expert's opinion that a reasonable woman in the
defendant's circumstances would have also employed self-defense is irrelevant, as Aris held.
Evidence Code section 1107 suggests that the Legislature
has overruled the Aris court's interpretation of Penal Code section 29 as barring an expert's opinion that the defendant actually
believed she had to kill. Evidence Code 1107(d) states "[t]his
section is intended as a rule of evidence only and no substantive
change affecting the Penal Code is intended." Penal Code section 29 is not a substantive rule of law. Rather, it is a rule of
evidence in criminal cases, barring expert opinion testimony as to
whether a defendant had or did not have a particular state of
117.
118;
119.
120.
pert to

CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West Supp. 1993).
[d. § 1107(a).
[d. § 1107(b).
This appears to codify the Aris court's finding that failure to allow the exstate such an opinion is error.
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mind required for an offense charged. The report of the Assembly Committee on Public Safety cites as "current law" section 29
and the Aris holding that BWS is relevant to prove the honesty
of a defendant's belief.121 The report then states that this bill
would authorize the admissibility of expert BWS testimony.l22
In addition, one version of section 1107 would have included language that the legislature did not intend to affect the holding in
Aris ,123 but this was dropped in a subsequent amendment. 124
The legislative history is rather vague as to the precise effect of
section 1107, nonetheless, these comments indicate that the Legislature was examining both the Aris opinion and Penal Code
section 29 when it considered section 1107. Since the Aris court
relied on Penal Code section 29 to bar an expert's opinion as to
the honesty of a defendant's belief in the need for self-defense,
the report's statement that BWS evidence is admissible under
section 1107 would imply that even if Penal Code section 29 applies,l25 Evidence Code section 1107 is an exception.126
As to an expert's opinion that the defendant's belief in the
need for self-defense was reasonable, the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary's report on the penultimate version of section 1107
states that the new section would allow expert opinion testimony
which is "related to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common
experience that the opinion of the expert would assist the trier of
the fact."127 This language is similar to the Aris court's rationale
that expert testimony that the defendant's belief in the need for
self-defense was reasonable is irrelevant because reasonableness
is not beyond the jury's common experience.128 Since this was
not subsequently altered, it appears that section 1107 codifies this
aspect of the Aris holding, barring an expert from stating an
121. REpORT OF THE CALIFORNIA AsSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY,
Cal. AB. 785, 1991-92 Reg. Sess. 1 (1991).

122. [d.
123. Cal. AB. 785, 1991-92 Reg. Sess. § 2 (stating that "[ilt is the intent of the
Legislature that this act not abrogate the holding of People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d
1178").
124. [d.
125. See supra notes 66-85 and accompanying text for the argument that Penal
Code § 29 does not apply.
126. See MENDEZ, supra note 48, at 293 n.24 (stating that "section 1107 could be
seen as creating an exception to section 29").
127. CALIFORNIA SENATE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, Cal. AB. 785, 1991-92
Reg. Sess. 3-4 (1991).
128. People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 179 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
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opinion that the defendant reasonably believed that she had to
defend herself.
Section 1107, however, does not clarify whether the jury may
consider general BWS testimony when assessing the reasonableness of a defendant's use of self-defense. In Aris, the court emphasized that while general expert BWS testimony is admissible,
a jury should not use such testimony to establish whether a defendant's use of self-defense was reasonable. 129 While no cases
have yet directly applied section 1107, in People v. Romero,130 an
appellate court pointed to the new section to bolster its conclusion that the defendant had been denied effective assistance of
counsel when her attorney did not investigate the possibility of
introducing BWS evidence to support her defense of duress. The
court stated "the [expert BWS] evidence is relevant to the woman's credibility and to support her testimony that she entertained a good-faith objectively reasonable and honest belief that
her act was necessary to prevent an imminent threat of greater
harm."131
The court's reasoning in Romero makes sense. Evidence
that a defendant has been subjected to abuse is one of the circumstances which a jury should consider in evaluating the reasonableness of a defendant's conduct and perception, just as a
history of bad relations or violence between a defendant and a
victim is relevant to the element of reasonableness in other
cases.132 Certainly, in other instances, the jury is told to consider
context when evaluating the reasonableness of the defendant's
conduct and beliefs.133 Thus, while codifying the admissibility of
expert BWS testimony, section 1107 should have specifically
stated that such testimony could be considered by a jury in evaluating the honesty and reasonableness of the defendant's belief in
the need to use deadly force, and should have explicitly overruled this holding of Aris.
Pending Senate Bill 1144 (SB 1144), introduced in the California Legislature's 1993-1994 Regular Session, recognizes that
the "current law of justifiable self-defense ... is too narrowly
129. Id. at 180-81; see also supra note 62 and accompanying text.
130. 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332, 338-42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that section 1107
did not apply to cases tried before its enactment).
131. [d. at 338-39 (emphasis added).
132. People v. Torres, 210 P.2d 324 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949) (holding that failure to instruct on prior threats of violence was reversible error).
133. See Madden, supra note 16, at 28.
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drawn to allow . . . a fair trial [for victims of domestic violence]."134 In situations where a battered woman resorts to
deadly force to defend herself:
current law of justifiable homicide, ... does not allow these
women to claim self-defense because the practical effect of the
"reasonable person" standard imposed upon jurors [which] results in their finding that [battered] women are not entitled to
justifiable homicide defenses because they did not attempt to
escape what they actually perceived as imminent danger. 135

Despite these laudable findings, the proposed new law does not
alter the definition of a "reasonable person" nor does it change
the definition of "imminence."
SB 1144 proposes three additions to the Penal Code. First,
SB 1144 appears to codify the "honest but unreasonable belief"
doctrine in People v. Flannel,136 by adding the following language
to the definition of manslaughter: 137 "the intentional killing of a
human being when, at the time of the killing, the person who kills
has an honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend
against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury."138 This
could prevent future challenges to the court-created doctrine of
imperfect self-defense.
The second addition proposed by SB 1144 creates a new and
separate justification for victims of domestic violence who kill
their batterers. Section 198.7 of the bill provides that one who
"has been subjected to a history or pattern of repeated willful
infliction of corporeal injury resulting in a traumatic condition, or
a victim of rape, sodomy, or repeated sexual abuse by the decedent,"139 is justified in killing the abuser if she honestly believed
"that there was imminent danger that the decedent would kill or
inflict great bodily injury on the person, . . . [and] that it was
necessary under the circumstances to use deadly force."140 The
defendant also must have believed "at the time he or she used
deadly force ... that [she] was a victim of felony false imprison134. Cal. S.B. 1144, supra note 3, § 1(f).
135. Id. § l(e).
136. 603 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979); see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
137. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1994).
138. Cal. S.B. 1144, supra note 3, § l(e) (emphasis added). The California
Supreme Court recently relied, in part, on this section of SB 1144 in finding that
1981 amendments to several sections of the Penal Code, while eliminating the defense of diminished capacity, did not alter the doctrine of imperfect or partial selfdefense. In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574, 582 (Cal. 1994).
139. Cal. S.B. 1144, supra note 3, § 3(b) (adding Penal Code § 198.7(b».
140. Id. (adding Penal Code § 198.7(c».
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ment."141 At first blush, this change appears to permit a battered
woman to present ,a claim of perfect self-defense based only on
her honest belief in the need to defend herself, and a showing
that she was a victim of felony false imprisonment, thus eliminating the need for her to additionally prove that she reasonably
feared for her life. However, closer examination reveals
otherwise.
The final addition to the Penal Code defines felony false imprisonment as a situation in which "the victim ... is intentionally
and unlawfully restrained or confined by violence or express or
implied threats of harm, by word or act, which threats cause the
victim to fear harm, ... and that fear is not unreasonable."142
The effect of the last two changes is not entirely clear. The proposed addition of section 198.7 to the Penal Code seems to provide that where a defendant has been in a battering relationship
and the victim of felony false imprisonment, use of self-defense
may be justified based on only the honest belief in the need for
self-defense. This reading of proposed section 198.7 would eliminate the requirement of reasonableness for victims of the doublefelony of physical or sexual abuse and false imprisonment. This
would change current self-defense law tremendously, making the
standard entirely subjective and eliminating any requirement
that the battered defendant show that her use of self-defense was
reasonable. Battered women who kill in non-traditional confrontational situations thus would have a much fuller opportunity
to prove that their conduct was justified.
However, a defendant claiming justification under proposed
section 198.7 must also show that she believed that she was a
victim of felony false imprisonment.143 The proposed addition of
section 237.1 to the Penal Code defines felony false imprisonment as a situation in which "the victim ... is intentionally and
unlawfully restrained or confined by violence or express or implied threats of harm, by word or act, which threats cause the
victim to fear harm, or injury to ... herself ... and that fear is not
141. Id. (adding Penal Code § 198.7(d)).
142. Id. (adding Penal Code § 237.1).
143. Id. § 3(d). The California Alliance Against Domestic Violence
("CAADV") disagrees with an approach which focuses on "imprisonment" as the
reason women remain in such relationships, arguing that fear of violence is only one
reason. Also, CAADV disagrees with the requirement that a defendant battered
woman come forward with evidence corroborating their claims of abuse. Nina Martin, Reasonable Women, CAL. LAW., Mar. 1994, at 58, 62-63.
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unreasonable.144 This specification, that the victim's fear of harm
not be unreasonable, seems to indirectly incorporate a reasonableness standard into the new definition of justification set out in
proposed section 198.7. Under proposed section 198.7, the defendant must have genuinely believed that she was a victim of
felony false imprisonment; however, false imprisonment requires
that the victim's fear of harm be reasonable.
One possible interpretation is that the reasonableness requirement is relevant only to prove that the batterer is guilty of
false imprisonment. A batterer may not be found guilty based
only on the genuine belief of the woman that she was a victim of
false imprisonment; her fear must also be reasonable. Certainly,
this makes sense. However, where the defendant is the battered
woman, rather than the batterer, a court could find that the reasonableness of a woman's fear required for false imprisonment is
incorporated into the new definition of justification, since proposed section 198.7 makes no mention of reasonableness. If this
is so, a battered woman who kills in a non-traditional confrontational setting will most likely be unable to prove that her fear was
reasonable, just as Ms. Aris was unable to do. While SB 1144
proclaims that the "reasonable person" standard is the problem,
it should either explicitly eliminate the reasonableness requirement, or codify a requirement that juries be instructed to consider evidence of BWS when they evaluate the reasonableness of
the defendant's fear.
Proposed changes to the definitions of both voluntary manslaughter and justification require that the defendant still have an
honest belief in the need to defend against an imminent danger.
The Ads court held that the definition of "imminence" is the
same for both perfect and imperfect self-defense claims.145 The
court concluded that regardless of whether the defendant honestly perceived an imminent danger, the danger must have been
actually imminent in order to support the defendant's claim of
imperfect self-defense. The proposed changes to manslaughter
and justification do not alter the definition of imminence as set
forth by the appellate court in Aris. A future battered woman
defendant who has killed in a non-traditional confrontational setting similar to that of Ms. Aris, would nonetheless have to prove
that the danger to her was actually imminent, not simply that she
144. Cal. S.B. 1144, supra note 3 (adding Penal Code § 237.1).
145. See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
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believed that she was in imminent danger from her sleeping batterer (to prevail under either the new definition of justification or
the new definition of manslaughter). Without a change to the
Aris court's definition of "imminence," despite the good intentions of the Legislature, a woman who kills in a non-traditional
confrontational setting will be guilty of second-degree murder.
Rather than create a separate justification for women who
kill their batterers in the context of an abusive relationship, it
makes more sense to remedy the erroneous definition of "imminence" set forth in Aris, with respect to imperfect self-defense.
As discussed at the beginning of this essay, the problems
presented by situations in which battered women kill their sleeping batterers are not necessarily due to the construct of self-defense law, but rather, as illustrated by the holdings of the Aris
court, are due to the unduly restrictive manner in which courts
apply self-defense elements to battered women. Rather than formulate a separate law of self-defense, it would be better to enact
legislation which corrects the narrowing effected by the Aris
court.
Under SB 1144, the main difference between finding voluntary manslaughter or justification is a matter of substantiating the
defendant's situation. First, to prove justification, a battered woman must corroborate her claim that her abuser subjected her to
a pattern of repeated corporeal injury. Corroborating evidence
must be "sufficient to substantiate enough of the [defendant's]
testimony to establish his or her credibility."l46 In most situations, there are witnesses who can testify that the defendant has
been subjected to such abuse, or there are medical records to
support her claim of abuse. Interestingly, when defendants not
suffering from battered woman syndrome claim self-defense,
their testimony alone may be sufficient to support the defense. 147
Second, to justify a killing, a defendant must prove that she honestly believed that she was a victim of felony false
imprisonment.148
Another pending bill combines the evidentiary and substantive changes described above. Assembly Bill 947 would amend
Evidence Code section 1107 to include the following subdivision:
In any case in which a defendant charged with murder under
section 187 of the Penal Code, or manslaughter under section
146. Cal. S.B. 1144, supra note 3, § 3(b) (adding Penal Code § 198.7).
147. See Martin, supra note 143, at 86.
148. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
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192 of the Penal Code, raises as a defense, partial or complete
justification, or excuse ... the defendant, in order to establish
the defendant's reasonable belief that the use of deadly force
was necessary to defend against imminent peril to life or great
bodily injury, shall be permitted to offer relevant evidence
pursuant to this section that the defendant had been the victim
of acts of domestic violence ... by the deceased. 149
Because this proposed change would allow BWS expert testimony to establish the reasonableness of a defendant's use of selfdefense, it requires courts to instruct the jury to consider this evidence when evaluating her self-defense claim. Also, a court
could not determine that a battered woman's use of self-defense
was unreasonable as a matter of law and refuse to instruct on
perfect self-defense, as Aris held. By requiring the admission of
BWS evidence to support reasonableness, the legislation would
necessarily limit the judge's ability to determine unreasonableness as a matter of law whenever the defendant introduces evidence that she was the victim of domestic violence.
While this proposal combines BWS evidence with substantive law, it nonetheless fails to address the issue of how courts
should define "imminence." Assembly Bill 947 would also
amend the law of manslaughter by adding section 192.1, similar
to the change proposed by Senate Bill 1144, to state that one who
kills in the "honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity to
defend against imminent peril" is guilty of manslaughter.150 Like
Senate Bill 1144, Assembly Bill 947 does not require that a danger actually be imminent for a jury to convict only of manslaughter, rather it is sufficient if the defendant honestly believed that
the danger was imminent, given her history of abuse. Without
making such clarification, again, a battered woman who kills in a
non-traditional confrontational situation will be found guilty of
second-degree murder, as Ms. Aris was, because she will be unable to convince the jury that her sleeping batterer presented an
actual imminent danger. The legislature should clarify that a
claim of imperfect self-defense should lead to manslaughter if the
jury finds that a defendant honestly believed she was in imminent
danger of death or serious bodily injury, whether or not she was
149. Cal. A.B. 947,1993-94 Reg. Sess. § led) (amending CAL. EVID. CODE 1107)
(emphasis added).
150. [d. § 2(a) (adding Penal Code § 192.1). In addition, Assembly Bill 947 provides that a defendant in the above situation would be guilty of voluntary manslaughter if she manifests an intent to kill, while one who does not manifest such an
intent would only be guilty of involuntary manslaughter. [d. § 2(a)(1), (2).

244

UCLA WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:217

actually in such danger, or a reasonable person would have believed the danger was not imminent.
I acknowledge that most battered women do not kill their
batterers while they sleep.151 Furthermore, I do not believe that
a separate defense for battered women who kill is necessary or
even a good idea. However, given the narrowing of self-defense
law by the appellate court in Aris, the California Legislature
should attempt to ensure that such battered women defendants
are able to present fully their claim of self-defense to the jury.
Therefore, I applaud the California Legislature's recent remedial
attempts. Nonetheless, the focus should not be on creating a separate defense for battered women, but rather on setting forth
definitions of "imminence" and "reasonableness" which would
allow a jury to consider the facts and effects of such abuse in
evaluating both the imminence of the danger presented by the
abuser, as well as the reasonableness of the defendant's belief in
the need for self-defense.
While Evidence Code section 1107 eliminated several obstacles to the admission of BWS evidence,152 a battered woman may
still be denied a fair opportunity to present a claim of self-defense to a jury since section 1107 does not require courts to instruct the jury that this evidence is relevant to whether the
defendant's use of self-defense was reasonable. The changes to
self-defense law proposed by SB 1144 are ill-advised in that they
create a separate law for battered women who kill their batterers.
Furthermore, SB 1144 does not correct the narrowing of the element of imminence effected by the court in Aris. Nor would simply redefining the element of imminence be sufficient. Without
the use of expert testimony, most jurors will not find that the
defendant is acting in self-defense when she kills in a non-traditional confrontational setting. California is on its way to remedying this problem, but emphasis should not be on creating a new
law of self-defense, but rather on expressly permitting juries to
consider BWS evidence in their evaluation of reasonableness,
and clarifying the definition of "imminent danger" when a defendant relies on imperfect self-defense.
151. See Maguigan, supra note 20, at 397. The author analyzed 223 incidents of
battered women who killed their batterers and found that twenty percent of the
killings were done in "nonconfrontational" situations. Four percent of these were
"contract killings", eight percent were "sleeping batterers", and in eight percent of
the incidents, the defendant was the "initial" aggressor during a lull in the violence.

Id.
152. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
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The California Legislature should adopt section one of AB
947 as it amends section 1107 of the Evidence Code.153 In addition, I suggest amending section 29 of the Penal Code to add the
following language: This section does not prohibit an expert
from testifying as to whether the defendant had or did not have
the required mental states to support an affirmative defense
which include duress and self-defense. This would remedy the
Aris court's incorrect interpretation of Penal Code section 29 as
a bar to an expert's testimony that the defendant honestly believed she was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
injury.
Further, the legislature should adopt the following proposed
section 192.1 of the Penal Code: In addition to section 192, manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being when, at the
time of the killing, the person who killed honestly believed that
he or she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury
and honestly believed that he or she had to defend himself or
herself, even if the danger was not actually imminent or even if a
reasonable person would not have believed such danger was imminent. This amendment would remedy the incorrect definition
of imminence with respect to imperfect self-defense. It would
also clarify an important distinction between perfect and imperfect self-defense. Perfect self-defense requires the defendant to
show that a reasonable person in her situation would have believed the danger to be imminent, while under the doctrine of
imperfect self-defense, a defendant need only show that she honestly believed the danger was imminent.
Such changes to the Evidence Code and to the Penal Code
will, without creating a separate law of self-defense for battered
women, provide such women who kill their batters with a better
opportunity to present claims of perfect and imperfect self-defense within the context of traditional self-defense law.

153. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.

